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Forum
invoke, and who casts the seducer into hell at the
end of the play. As I pointed out in my article, it is
only in this context that the ending of the play is
defensible. Otherwise, we must stand with Camus
and Dom Juan himself. We must believe that Moliere has insulted his audience by granting a soulless
lump of cold stone an arbitrary victory over his
human hero. This supernatural ending to a drama
of purely physical action would be a nasty, tawdry
contradiction of the play's entire momentum. I will
spare the reader a recapitulation of my entire argument in support of my interpretation of the conflict,
but it seems to me evident that only by admitting
God as Dom Juan's principal antagonist can one
make tolerable sense of Moliere's play.
FRANCISL. LAWRENCE

Tulane University

Wordsworth's Later Style
To the Editor:
The three "close readings" described in the March
1978 Editor's Column were introduced with this
line from Marianne Moore: "we do not admire
what we cannot understand." The proposition is, of
course, as patently false to experience as is Keats's
at the end of the "Ode on a Grecian Urn." We often
admire exceedingly what we do not understand,
precisely because we do not understand it. This is as
true of literary criticism as of religious revelation
(the two activities having become strangely similar
these days), and one of the three "close readings"
referred to is a significant case in point. I admire
Geoffrey Hartman's article "Blessing the Torrent:
On Wordsworth's Later Style" (PMLA, 93 [1978],
196-204) because, as one of the specialist readers
noted, it seems to "open perspectives." I am haunted
by the possibility, however, that my admiration is
naive and that what I would believe is sublimity of
thought may be, in part at least, ingenious confusion.
It would be unfair not to place the Wordsworth
article in context. Hartman is quite consciously voyaging on strange seas of hermeneutic thought. His
professed aim is to "de-normalize" what appears to
be a reasonably "normal" sonnet by revealing "an
unapparent meaning"; or, as he puts it in the Preface
to Beyond Formalism, "to release a hidden or repressed content." Now a certain latitude must be
allowed to an enterprise that takes literary criticism
into the realm not only of philosophy but of psychoanalysis as well. We suffer, therefore, the obstructive, opaque, and esoteric jargon-"infinitizing,"
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"phantomized," "the topos of the sublime as such,
of the atopic," "uncovers a traumatological structure," "Wordsworth's lucy-feric style . . . appears to
be the opposite of luciferic." But our hopes of liberating Hartman's own "hidden" meanings from all
this are not always fulfilled. Sometimes it takes an
act of blind faith to believe that such verbal pyrotechnics signify something more than sound and
fury.
And if we do possess that requisite faith (or credulity), there are both theoretical and practical
difficulties to be faced. Whatever else it may involve,
interpretation cannot escape the fact that it is also
an act of persuasion that necessarily has to do with
rules of evidence and argumentation. How well and
of what does Hartman persuade us? What evidence
does he present and by what rules does he present
it? Surely interpretation is not altogether immune
from the scientific discipline that condemns the
multiplication of needless, arbitrary, or self-indulgent complexities. Hartman's excursions into "unapparent" meaning frequently overleap the bounds
of evidence and of common sense.
His discussion of the verb "possess" in Section vi
of the article is, I think, a fair and typical example.
Although both English usage and poetic context
suggest the contrary, Hartman decides that "we cannot be sure that 'possess' is in the indicative." He
then piles hypothetical assumptions one upon the
other-"It might be read," "if we understand,"
"may involve"-to arrive at the reading he desires:
Wordsworth blesses the torrent. Certainly the rules
of English grammar do not stand in his way:
"Though this further reading does not harmonize
grammatically with the line that follows, it may
hover over it as an inward possibility." There may
be enlightened readers of Kenneth Burke to whom
such a statement is meaningful. Not being among
them, I can only conclude that Hartman is simply
trying to have his cake and eat it too. Anything, it
seems, can mean or echo anything (see the discussion of supposed Miltonic echoes in Section VII), as
long as we attach enough "may's," "might's," and
"if's."
It is not easy to decide whether these extravagances are personal or methodological. Have Hartman's productive insights into Romantic placenames become a compulsive hobbyhorse? Or does
the article suggest the inherent danger of "Continental" modes of criticism? If the critic proposes
a journey beyond formalism in order to liberate the
repressed content of a poem, he must somehow persuade us that the subjectivity so liberated transcends
his own. I doubt that Hartman always succeeds in
doing this. His entry into the sonnet is by way of his
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own "discomfort" at its initial apostrophe: "How art
thou named?" But his attempts to convince us that
what he feels is what Wordsworth felt or what we,
too, should feel are terribly strained. Attempts to
squeeze relevance out of Wordsworth's letter to
Beaumont in Section ii or to find meaningful ambiguity in the phrase "Rotha, my Spiritual Child" in
Section v are shallow bits of ingenuity at best.
But what of the article's putative subject, Wordsworth's later style? Hartman proposes to elucidate
the meaning of neoclassical, formulaic rhetoric in
the sonnet and, by extension, in Wordsworth's later
work. What do we learn about this subject? We learn
that Wordsworth may use such rhetoric both to express and to "domesticate" his fears concerning the
power of imagination. This is interesting, but Hartman himself glosses over the fact that such rhetorical
devices are present in Wordsworth's early poetry as
well. The article gives no hint concerning the kinds
of quantitative, objective verbal studies on which differentiations between "early" and "late"-not to
mention neoclassical and Romantic-styles can reasonably be made.
One could multiply instances of assertive, undocumented, flamboyant impressionism in the article
(see, for example, the assertion of "strange resemblance [sic]" between the sonnet's "narrow room"
and the "narrow chasm" of the Simplon Pass in
Section III). But there are larger issues at stake. Few
of us would deny that new-critical formalism has
seen its day or that critics like Hartman have opened
up exciting new possibilities. For this, admiration is
due, even if we happen to feel that some of these
critics make assumptions about the nature of language that threaten the very existence of literary
studies. At least there is room for debate, and, as
Blake says, "Damn braces." The time may have
come, however, to reaffirm some basic rules of the
game, things like plain speech wherever possible,
attention to evidence, and the avoidance of ingenuity for its own sake. More and more the critic
himself-his consciousness, his subjectivity, his intentionality-struts center stage wearing the mask
of poet and poem. Whatever my admiration for the
latter, and it is real, I still think that I prefer the
"normalized" William Wordsworth to the "unapparent" Geoffrey Hartman.
SPENCER HALL

Rhode Island College
Mr. Hartman replies:
One can reply to a polemical piece; it is harder
to engage something that despite its faint opening

praise does not really try to understand the perspective and critical style it attacks. I won't defend
that style here; but I can suggest that Hall's call for
law, order, and proper argument has its own questionable assumptions that, to my mind, depress literary studies today.
I note first that no counterinterpretation is
offered. A normal interpretation is assumed-perhaps the one I start from in my essay-but that
has never been articulated. Even a "normal" interpretation has to be made; it is not a given until it is
made. How easy and fruitless it is to insist that poets
have their commonsensical, normal meaning, without articulating it! Anyone who does try to express
that meaning would learn, however, that poems of
stature achieve their so-called normalcy against
odds, which remain part of the meaning. Interpretation, I. A. Richards once said, is always a victory
against odds.
There may not even be a single location of meaning. The interpreter is bound to enter the scene of
interpretation, either in his own person or in a representative capacity. All meaning is received meaning. Moreover, the retroactive force of literature on
literature-and literature for me includes the literature of criticism and scholarship-is by now too
well substantiated to be reduced to subjectivity and
personalism.
Hall thinks I am interested in what is "unapparent" for egotistical reasons. By constructing an unapparent meaning I try to become apparent as
interpreter. Yet he does not refute the interpretation
put forward; instead, by his own appeal to the reader
he claims (1) that I have not followed certain rules
of the game, so my findings cannot be admitted, and
(2) that some of my findings (not clearly specified)
might be worthwhile but that others (specified) are
"shallow bits of ingenuity." Granted that he did not
have the space to back his arguments fully, he still
should have said something about the rules, and
should not have assumed so magisterially that every
sane reader shares his understanding of them.
Concerning the "unapparent" level of meaning,
I go as carefully as possible from more apparent to
less apparent, although these distinctions are relative. What is less apparent today may be apparent
enough tomorrow; the obverse movement, from apparent to unapparent, is also familiar to those who
appreciate the mutability of language and of meaning. Has Hall never questioned the appearances?
"The unsaid part is the best of every discourse"
(Emerson).
I return to the issue of rules. What constitutes
evidence, or the relation of hypothesis to proof, is,
as everyone knows, much disputed. If, for instance,
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one does not accept any meaning that is not
straightforwardly grammatical, then indeed one
must reject my interpretation of "possess" in line
13 of Wordsworth's "To the Torrent at Devil's
Bridge." But if grammatical expression is considered as only one rule by which to determine meaning in poetry, then the situation changes. My subject
was not Wordsworth's grammar or his poetic ingenuity in that area but his remarkable attitude toward
the "force" of language. The grammatical point
about "possess" is subordinated in my essay to
Wordsworth's concern with naming, cursing, and
blessing, whose locutionary force may extend (that
was my suggestion) to such grammatical particulars.
Hall, I suspect, has a more prudential (he calls it
"plain speech") understanding of language than I
have. He combs my essay to show that it is iffy in
a way that hides assertiveness, that it plays with
terms, and that it is unquantitative. Though he considers these as flaws of argumentation, they seem
to me presumptive matters of style. He is less of a
logician than an arbiter elegantiarum. But I don't
want to dispute a particular point: it is the entire
attitude of the man that is perplexing. What if the
game of criticism has changed, or the rules of the
game are being questioned? Even if that were not
so, do we want critics to be certified by a Normal
School?
As to style, it is conceivable that a flexible or
playful mode of writing-apparently admitted only
outside of criticism-comes closer to the rules of
the language game than Hall's sober, scientific, and
uppity standards. Besides, he knows he is not all that
objective. "Damn braces," he says, quoting from
Blake's Proverbs of Hell. He might have remembered further hellish axioms. For instance: "One
Law for the Lion and the Ox is Oppression." Or the
other half of what he quotes: "Bless relaxes." Then
"Let Hall house of Hall relax, and bless the Torrent
with the Interpreter."
He himself violates a rule of the game, as I understand it, by an imperfect quotation from Beyond
Formalism that makes it appear as if I were a vulgar
demystifier or depth analyst. The preface to my
book discusses a difference in the concept of literary
form. I do not simply justify the Continental style
of criticism but point out, rather, that "it often neglects literary form and dissolves art into a reflex of
consciousness, technology, or social process." I go on
to suggest, however, that "In Anglo-America, respect for literary form is a priori, but not necessarily
deeper. A more radical difference between the two
approaches [Continental and Anglo-American] centers on the presumed objectivity of the work of art:
for us the reader in his selfhood is the problem, and
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he needs historical, philological, or similar correctives . . . but for the Continental critic it is the objective form of art that seems problematic, and he
seeks to liberate it, to release a hidden or repressed
content." Hall leaves out the concluding sentence,
with which I will conclude again, in the hope, now
as then, of finding a better understanding in this
country for an alternative, though by no means
alien, mode of thinking about art. "Not our subjectivity is to be feared but our overreaction to it,
those pseudo-objective criteria which imprison both
the work and ourselves."
GEOFFREY HARTMAN

Yale University
La Vie de Saint Alexis
To the Editor:
To Evelyn Birge Vitz's excellent demonstration
of the inadequacy of Greimasian narratological analysis, in "La Vie de Saint Alexis: Narrative Analysis
and the Quest for the Sacred Subject" (PMLA, 93
[1978], 396-408), I should like to add some considerations on the origin of Greimas' doctrines and to
suggest a broader-based, more generally valid approach.
Like many other types of linguistic, stylistic, and
philosophical theory, Greimas' concepts of Subject,
Object, Beneficiary, and the rest are too narrowly
based on Indo-European grammatical structure. The
major clause or "sentence" in modern French, English, and other Indo-European languages has one
element traditionally termed the "subject," one the
"direct object," and one the "indirect object" (all
three of them either simple or compound), and various complements indicating helpers, obstacles, and
the like. This type of linguistic structure is the obvious source not only of Greimas' analysis but also
of medieval philosophers' distinctions between the
signans (nominative, hence "actor" or subject, "that
which signifies") and the signatum (accusative,
hence "goal" or direct object, "that which is signified") and of Ferdinand de Saussure's corresponding formulation of the linguistic sign as involving a
signifiant and a signifie.
These structural features are far from universal.
Even Latin sentence structure did not involve the
obligatory presence of a subject (cf. such impersonal
verbs as pluit 'it rains,' which, in their literal meaning, cannot have a subject). Greimasian analysis
in terms of a single Subject and Object is applicable
only to tightly knit works such as Racinian tragedies
(cf. the old parallel between the five acts of Berenice
and the five-word Tacitean sentence Titus Berenicen
invitus invitam dimisit).

